Introduction.
Most solution concepts that have been proposed for «-person games are essentially static in nature.
That is, once a "stable" point is proposed, there will be no "objection" to that point, and the tendency will be to stay there.
However, nothing is said about what is likely to occur at a point which is not stable.
There is nothing generally in the definition of stability to guarantee that an unstable situation will tend toward a stable one.
In We remark here that Y" is a compact, convex polyhedron (which, however, may be empty since we are assuming nothing about the game v). We are able to say more. As we will next prove, every transfer sequence is convergent.
Theorem 2.9. Given x e Rn, there exists a real number ß(x°) such that, for all transfer sequences {xlj^.n starting at x°, oo (2.9.1) X ||*i+1 -*f|| </3(x°). Proof. In either case, the sequence is a transfer sequence, and therefore We remark here that in either of the cases treated in 3.1 we have 5-°ln ||*' + 1 -x'|| < ß, where ß will depend either on x° or on Y, but ß is independent of h.
A. Global stability. Let a" be a demand function, and consider the system of differential equations
Since D is continuous, there exist solutions to (4.1) through any initial point x° e
Rn. From [9, Theorem 1.31, p. 9], it follows that the solutions of (4.1) are defined for all t £ R, since each D. is nonnegative and bounded above by the piecewise linear function £.,., (k-. + k-).
We will be concerned here only with solutions defined on R + = [O, 00) and starting at some fixed inital point, x e R". That is, we will consider functions 0: ß + -> 7?" such that 0(0) = x° and d<p. Then the unique solution c6 to x' = K(x) such that (ß(0) = x° has the property that limi-.oo fiirt eK. 
